Abstract-Dynamic spectrum auctions have been considered a promising approach to effectively re-distribute spectrum resources in the secondary spectrum market. However, the existing spectrum auctions are limited to allocating spectrum in units of channels. Recently software defined radio technologies make exciting progress in operating radios with variable bandwidths. They push the need for designing more flexible spectrum auction frameworks that allow to allocate spectrum with variable bandwidth to the secondary user. In this paper, we design truthful spectrum auction frameworks in which secondary users can bid for, and then be actually allocated spectra with variable bandwidths. Instead of submitting valuations for channels (i.e., numbers) as bids, in our frameworks, each secondary user submits his valuation as a function of the bandwidth of spectrum. We first present a truthful framework for auctions of variable-bandwidth spectra in single collision domains, which can achieve system efficiency. Then, we propose a similar framework for multiple collision domains and rigorously show that it is also truthful. Results of extensive evaluations demonstrate that both of our spectrum auction frameworks for variable bandwidth are effective.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the fast-growing popularity of wireless network technologies, the wireless spectrum is becoming increasingly crowded. At the same time, measurements show that the spectrum allocated through static auctions is under utilized [1] . In order to utilize wireless spectrum more efficiently, recently a lot of attention has been given to building a secondary spectrum market, in which primary spectrum users can dynamically sell available channels to secondary users, through real-time auctions. Some spectrum auction frameworks have been proposed, with the goals of truthfulness, system efficiency, maximum revenue and/or fairness (e.g., [2] , [3] , [4] ).
Dynamic spectrum auctions are effective in re-allocating spectrum resources and providing incentives for primary users to re-distribute their spectrum. However, we notice that the existing auction frameworks have the following limitation: In existing auction frameworks, available spectrum can only be auctioned in units of channels, i.e., each secondary user bids for one or multiple channels and the payments due are calculated based on the allocated channels. In contrast, recently advanced software defined radio technologies push the need for more flexible spectrum auction frameworks that allow to allocate spectra with variable bandwidths to secondary users. Specifically, these technologies enable the communication devices to operate with variable bandwidths, e.g., the 802.22 draft already includes the support for variable bandwidth. Moreover, 978-1-4673-3122-7/13/$31.00 ©2013 IEEE recent studies (e.g., [5] , [6] ) have focused on building wireless networks in which the channel bandwidth can be adaptively changed. All the exciting progress in operating radios in variable bandwidths becomes an outcry for spectrum auction frameworks that allow primary users to allocate spectra in variable bandwidths, not just channels with a fixed bandwidth.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing work has studied variable-bandwidth spectrum auctions. In this paper, we aim to design a truthful auction framework that supports allocating variable bandwidths of spectra without interference. Moreover, since system efficiency is a natural requirement when considering a spectrum auction, we also require our auction framework to be system efficient. Here system efficiency means that the system-wide total valuation should be maximized (see Section II for the precise definition).
The major challenges in designing such auction frameworks come from the nature of variable bandwidth. First, bidding for variable bandwidths makes it more complicated to describe a secondary user's demand for, and valuation of, the spectrum. Second, when allocating variable-bandwidth spectrum, we need to be more careful in order to avoid interference. Different from the channel allocation, where interference happens only when neighbors are assigned to exactly the same channel, in the variable-bandwidth spectrum allocation, interference exits as long as the overlap of neighbors' assigned spectra is not zero. Third, in order to guarantee truthfulness, it is more challenging to determine the amount of charge for a variable bandwidth spectrum than for a channel with a fixed bandwidth.
In addition to the above challenges, there is another factor that contributes to the hardness of the problem we try to solve: In this paper, we allow each secondary user to have multiple devices located at different positions. To bid for spectrum, each secondary user submits his valuation of spectrum for each device he owns. This further complicates the spectrum auction problem, because a secondary user can cheat in his claim of valuation on one device, which may benefit his other devices, so that he can obtain higher overall utilities. We will show how to tackle this difficulty in Section IV.
In order to support variable bandwidth spectrum auctions, we need to enable secondary users to submit their valuations for each possible bandwidth of spectrum on each device. So, unlike existing dynamic spectrum auction frameworks, our frameworks use a valuation function to describe each secondary user's valuation of all possible allocations of Another goal of our design is to achieve system efficiency for the spectrum allocation. System efficiency is defined as follows.
In this section, we design and analyze a variable bandwidth spectrum auction framework, VSA-S, for the situation in which all devices are in a single collision domain. The design goals are the interference-free spectrum that achieves the maximum system-wide total valuation and the truthfulness of the framework. Although the major contribution of this paper is the design of the spectrum auction framework for multiple-collision domains, thoroughly studying a simpler case allows us to better understand the nature of spectrum auction for variable bandwidths, and develop the key technique also used in multiple collision domains.
A. Truthfulness
In the spectrum auction, the utility for each secondary user i is decided by the profile of valuation function sets of all secondary users. We denote this profile by V. Formally, we have:
Pi is the price of using the spectrum for user i. Intuitively, Eq. 1 means that the utility of secondary user i is equal to i's total valuation of the spectra assigned to his devices minus the payment he needs to make for his use of spectra.
Given this game theoretic model, a spectrum auction in our scenario is truthful if and only if it is a dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) [9] for all secondary users to submit their true valuation functions. Intuitively, a DSE guarantees that every player of the game has incentives to play the strategies specified by the DSE regardless of other players' behavior.
Definition 1. A spectrum auction is said to be truthful if it is a DSE for all secondary users to submit their true valuation function sets, i.e., for any secondary user i, assuming Vi T is the true valuation function set of secondary user i, for any valuation function set ViA submitted by secondary user
i, for any profile V-i of valuation functions submitted by all secondary users other than i, spectrum on each device. Hence, in an auction, each secondary user submits a set of valuation functions, not a set of numbers, to the primary user, as his bid. Valuation functions promise a more flexible form of bidding, by which variable bandwidth of spectrum can be auctioned.
Our contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We are the first to study spectrum auctions for allocating variable bandwidth spectrum to secondary users.
• We present an auction framework VSA-S, for yariable bandwidth Spectrum Auction in Single collision domains. We rigorously show that VSA-S is truthful and system efficient.
• For yariable bandwidth Spectrum Auction, we present a framework VSA-M that can be shown to be truthful.
• We have done extensive experiments to evaluate our spectrum auction frameworks and the results demonstrate that they have good performance. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the technical preliminaries. In Sections III, we propose VSA-S and in Section IV we propose VSA-M. Section V is dedicated to evaluation results. Finally, we briefly review related literature in Section VI and then conclude in Section VII.
II. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
We consider spectrum auctions in which a primary user sells spectra with variable bandwidths to K secondary users. Suppose that each secondary user i has D, devices that need to use a bandwidth of spectrum. We use an interference graph to model the interference among the devices. If and only if two devices are within the interference range of each other, they become neighbors (i.e., connected by an edge) in the interference graph. (Throughout the paper, we use "neighbor" to refer to a neighbor in the interference graph.)
Assume that the information about available spectrum is stored in an occupancy database as required by FCC [7] and it changes slowly over time. Suppose that the frequency spectrum held by the primary user available for auction is (Ii, Ih), where h (resp. Ih) is the lowest (resp. highest) frequency in the available spectrum and Ih -h == W.
Unlike the existing works where secondary users submit numbers to represent their valuations in order to bid for channels, in our auctions each secondary user i submits a valuation function set Vi to the primary user. In particular, for each of his device d, i submits a valuation function Vi,d(). The valuation function expresses the secondary user i's valuation on device d as a function of the bandwidth available to device d. We adopt the standard assumption from the literature of economics [8] that every valuation function Vi,d() is strictly increasing and differentiable quasiconcave.
Upon receiving the valuation functions from the secondary users, the primary user first allocates spectrum with variable bandwidth to each winning device according to the valuation functions, and then computes the corresponding prices for using the spectra charged to the secondary users.
A. Design of Auction Framework
Now we formalize the spectrum allocation problem in a single collision domain. 
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The idea that we adopt is from the well-known multiunit YCG auction mechanism to achieve system efficiency and truthfulness in single collision domains. The key ideas of multi-unit YCG are greedy spectrum allocation and opportunity-cost-based payment.
In 
B. Analysis of Framework
Formally, we can prove that YSA-S is both truthful and system efficient.
Theorem 3. In a single collision domain, VSA-S is truthful.

Theorem 4. In a single collision domain, VSA-S achieves system efficiency.
Due to the limited space, we leave the proofs of Theorems 3 and 4 to a technical report [10] .
IY. AUCTION FRAMEWORK FOR MULTIPLE COLLISION
DOMAINS
In the previous section, we have proposed a spectrum auction framework for single collision domain that guarantees truthfulness and system efficiency. However, if we consider multiple collision domains, to achieve system efficiency, even one simplified version of our problem is already NP-Hard: When we simplify our problem to require that each device is allocated with a fixed bandwidth of spectrum, rather than variable bandwidth, the spectrum allocation problem becomes equivalent to the graph coloring problem [5] . Therefore, designing a system efficient spectrum allocation for variable bandwidths is NP-hard.
Given this fact of hardness, we have to weaken our objective for multiple collision domains. We will focus on designing a truthful and feasible spectrum auction framework, which is also challenging. The main challenges are from multiple devices that each secondary user may have, and how to charge the use of spectra with variable bandwidths.
A. Design of Auction Framework
Now we introduce our spectrum allocation algorithm, which consists of two steps. As the first step, to enable simultaneous allocation, we divide the spectrum (il, ih) into~intervals, and assign the center frequency of each device to one of the interval centers. Neighbor devices in the interference graph are not assigned in the same intervals, and the devices belonging to the same secondary user are not assigned in adjacent spectrum intervals (in order to prevent secondary users from cheating by manipulating valuation of multiple adjacent devices).
As the second step of our algorithm, we assign spectrum slices to devices in a greedy fashion. In particular, YSA-M "grows" each device's spectrum following the rules below:
(1) No Overlaps. The growth of a device's spectrum must start from the spectrum closest to its center frequency and gradually go to farther spectrum, but not beyond the center frequency in the adjacent intervals. Once YSA-M decides not to assign a symmetric pair to the device, the growth must terminate. In this way, each device is competing for spectrum with the devices in the adjacent spectrum intervals.
(2) Symmetric Allocation. The spectrum of a device grows in symmetric pairs of spectrum slices of length E. Specifically, suppose that, in the first step, YSA-M has assigned the center frequency of device (i, d) as CFi,d.
Then, in the second step, after assigning symmetric pairs of spectrum slices to this device, the device's spectrum can only grow to 4 Due to the limited space, we leave the proofs of Theorems 5 to [10] .
B. Analysis of Auction Framework
Theorem 5. In multiple collision domains, VSA-M is truthful.
V. EVALUATIONS
Since we have already proved that our spectrum auction frameworks for single collision domain and multiple collision domains are truthful, our experimental evaluations focus on the total valuation of allocated spectra in the system.
B. Total Valuation
The second set of experiments is to evaluate our two auction frameworks in terms of satisfying spectrum demands.
For the single collision domain, we measure the total valuation of allocated spectra for the case that all secondary users bid truthfully and compare it with the case that there is no payment scheme enforced in the system and one secondary user cheats in his submission of valuation functions. The result distributions shown in Fig. 1 demonstrate that VSA-S, which guarantees the truthfulness and system 
A. Experiments Setup
The experiments are performed using GloMoSim [11] on a laptop with 2.0GHz Centrino CPU and 1.96GB RAM. We modify GloMoSim to enable the use of variable spectra bandwidths, by setting the MAC layer parameters described in [12] .
Unless specified otherwise, we assume that 3 secondary users, each of whom has 2 devices, are randomly located in an area of 300 x 300 m 2 (for single collision domain experiments), or 600 x 600 m 2 (for multiple collision domains experiments). The transmission power of each device is 16dBm. The path loss is set to free space. In all experiments except those in Section V-B, we assume that the available band is 48MHz in DTV whitespace (644MHz-692MHz). All traffic is single hop UDP flows that are always backlogged. We set the packet size to 1500 Bytes.
In our experiments, we assume each valuation function is in one of the following two forms: for each integer x s.t., 1~x~~do 6: if
CFi,d== fz + (x -~) . s. 
where n~0 is an integer. The fundamental reason of using symmetric allocation is to guarantee truthfulness when secondary users have multiple devices. We will show this in the truthfulness proof. (3) Greedy Assignment. A symmetric pair is assigned to a device only if the device's valuation of this pair of spectrum slices is the highest among all its neighbors' valuations of the conflicting pairs. Here a conflicting pair is a symmetric pair of spectrum slices for a neighbor (not for this device) that overlaps with this symmetric pair. Payment Calculation. Once the growths of all devices' spectra are completed, VSA-M calculates the payment each secondary user needs to make for his use of spectra: This payment is equal to the sum of payments the secondary user needs to make for each symmetric pair of spectrum slices assigned to each of his devices. For each pair assigned to a device, the amount of payment due is determined by the device's neighbors belonging to other secondary users. We consider the valuations of conflicting pairs from such neighbors and use the highest such valuation as the payment.
The entire VSA-M framework is shown in Algorithm 2. efficiency, can significantly increase (7.62% on average) the total valuation of allocated spectra with the presence of one cheating secondary user. 
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In a recent work [17] , Wu et al. consider the noncooperative channel allocation problem, when the channel width is adaptive. Although this work makes good contributions to non-cooperative adaptive-width channel allocation in general, our focus is in a different setting of secondary spectrum market and we allow more fine-grained spectrum allocation with the consideration of primary and secondary users' incentives.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we consider a more flexible form of dynamic spectrum auction, i.e., the spectrum can be sold in variable bandwidths. We propose two spectrum auction frameworks with proved truthfulness and good system efficiency properties, for single collision domain and multiple collision domains, respectively. There are many possible ways to further improve our auction frameworks. For example, our auction framework for multiple collision domains can be further extended to achieve better approximation of system efficiency. We leave these topics to future work. For multiple collision domains, we measure the total valuation of allocated spectra for VSA-M in two different bands, the 2.4GHz ISM band and the DTV whitespaces, respectively. We assume that there are 80MHz available bandwidth in the 2.4GHz ISM band, and 48 MHz available bandwidth (644MHz-692MHz) in DTV whitespaces. Fig.  2 shows the distributions of total valuation of allocated spectra of 100 runs, for our auction framework VSA-M, and a spectrum allocation algorithm that achieve approximate maximum total valuation using [13] . In the figure, we can see that, for both the 2.4GHz ISM band and the DTV whitespace, the total valuation of allocated spectra in the system remains at a high level, compared with the approximate algorithm. Since the there are more bandwidth available in 2.4GHz ISM band, system-wide total valuation is higher than that of DTV whitespace.
VI. RELATED WORK
There is a considerable number of existing works on dynamic spectrum auctions (e.g., [2] , [3] , [14] , [4] ). For example, in [2] , Zhou et al. propose a truthful and computationally efficient auction scheme; in [14] , Zhou and Zheng make an important improvement by considering the incentives of the spectrum seller. Our work provides more flexibility in selling unused spectrum with variable size of units.
There are also a number of works on non-cooperative channel assignment problem in wireless networks [15] , [16] , [17] . All these works are on assignment of fixed-width channels, rather than on allocation of spectra with variable bandwidths.
